It Is Time to Look at Reissues Again by Hogan, Charles M.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 3 
1968 
It Is Time to Look at Reissues Again 
Charles M. Hogan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles M. Hogan, It Is Time to Look at Reissues Again, 5 Tulsa L. J. 223 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 5 OCTOBER, 1968 NUMBER 3
IT IS TIME TO LOOK AT REISSUES AGAIN
CHARLES M. HOGAN*
The Supreme Court of the United States has not since
1942 interpreted the patent reissue statutes.1
Traditionally a patent has been regarded as a contract
between the inventor and the United States Government. In
consideration of a full disclosure of the invention, adequate
to enable one of ordinary skill in the relevent art to practice
it, the United States Government grants to the inventor the
exclusive right, for a period of seventeen years, to practice
the invention as defined by the claims, which constitute a part
of the patent specification. Claims are analogous to a fence
around a parcel of real estate in that they define the nature
of the inventor's contribution and the respects in which it
departs patentably from the prior art. A claim commonly con-
sists of a plurality of related elements constituting a combina-
tion. A claim provides a challenge to the ingenuity of rival
innovators in that the omission of an element in a combina-
tion claim avoids infringement. In some cases the particular
element might inadvertently have been included in the original
patent claim. If it is superfluous or unnecessary, as in the case
where its inclusion was due to inadvertence, accident or mis-
take, the inventor has an equity to reform the patent con-
tract, so as to obtain a revised or additional claim in which
the superfluous element is omitted. Otherwise, the invention
is not adequately protected against appropriation by others.
Accordingly, the patent statutes authorize the reissue of a
* General Patent Counsel, Avco Corporation; A.B., Xavier
University; B.S.E.E., Purdue University; LL.B., Franklin
University; J. D., University of Cincinnati.
1 U.S. Industrial Chem., Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chem.
Corp., 315 U.S. 668 (1942).
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patent in which the inventor's claim represents less than is
his just due.
Reissue patent law has classically been treated in a man-
ner closely analogous to the law of reformation of contracts.
If the original claim purposely includes the superfluous ele-
ment, perhaps one omitted by a rival innovator, or if the origi-
nal patentee did not teach a combination without such ele-
ment, then the original patentee has no equity for reissue. If
the law were otherwise, then a patentee, having obtained his
original claim for a plurality of elements, could await the fur-
ther progress of the art, and then seek to cover by a reissue
patent later or independently devised structures comprising a
lesser number of elements. It is in this respect that the reissue
statute is susceptible to abuse by frauds. The Supreme Court of
the United States frequently interpreted the former patent
reissue statute and did not hesitate to strike down fraudu-
lent reissues. But in 1952 a new reissue statute was enacted
and subsequent decisions have been so liberal as to make re-
issues favorites of the law. It is time for the Supreme Court
of the United States to look at reissues again.
A substantial body of decisional law developed around
the former reissue statutes.2 Prior to the Patent Act of 1952 the
2 Act of May 24, 1928, ch. 730, § 4916, 45 Stat. 732 provided:
Whenever any patent is wholly or partly
inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defec-
tive or insufficient specification, or by reason
of the patentee claiming as his own invention
or discovery more than he had a right to claim
as new, if the error has arisen by inadver-
tence, accident or mistake, and without any
fraudulent or deceptive intention, the com-
missioner shall, on the surrender of such pat-
ent for the same invention, and in accordance
with the corrected specification, to be reissu-
ed to the patentee or to his assigns or legal
representatives, for the unexpired part of the
term of the original patent .... The specifi-
cations and claims in every such case shall be
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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general principles applicable to reissue were as stated in Son-
tag Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut Co. of California.3 When
the claims of an original patent were inadequate to cover all
that was disclosed, the legal operation of the issuance of the
patent was that the unclaimed matter was dedicated to the
public. This legal effect of the original patent could not be
avoided unless the patentee surrendered the patent and met
all of the requirements for reissue: i.e., proof that the speci-
fication was framed by real inadvertence, accident, or mis-
take, and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention. Noth-
ing but a clear mistake or inadvertence and a speedy appli-
cation for its correction would suffice to meet the require-
ments of the statute when the patentee sought merely to en-
large the claims by reissue.
Deliberate action-i.e., purposeful failure to claim un-
claimed subject matter-was of course not a mistake. When
it was shown that unclaimed matter was intentionally omitted
or abandoned, it could not be recouped by reissue at all-for
the simple reason that deliberate action excludes the required
inadvertence, accident or mistake.
Some examples of such deliberate abandonment were
acquiescence in the rejection of a claim, and acceptance
of a patent containing limitations imposed by the Patent Of-
subject to revision and restrictions in the
same manner as original applications are. ...
[B]ut no new matter shall be introduced into
the specification, or in case of a machine pat-
ent shall the model or drawings be amended,
except each by the other; but when there is
neither model nor drawing, amendments may
be made upon proof satisfactory to the com-
missioner that such new matter or amend-
ment was a part of the original invention,
and was omitted from the specification by in-
advertence, accident, or mistake, as aforesaid.
3 310 U.S. 281, 45 U.S.P.Q. 448 (1940).
19681
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fice which narrowed the scope of the invention as at first
described and claimed.4 Other instances were the previous de-
liberate disclaimer of the subject matter sought to be recover-
ed by reissue or the substance thereof.5
The above were not at all the only circumstances which
negatived the existence of inadvertence, accident or mistake.
An even more striking instance of such lack occurred when
a patentee obtained the original patent by emphasizing a par-
ticular feature. In such cases the courts were quick to hold a
reissue patent invalid or not allowable as a matter of law when
the very feature emphasized in obtaining allowance of the
original was omitted from the reissue claims.0
Indeed the old decisions tended to discourage a reissue-
abuse practice whereby certain applicants would emphasize
a particular element for the purpose of obtaining an original
patent and would then assert that the presence of that ele-
ment in the claims was an unnecessary limitation for the pur-
pose of obtaining a reissue patent without that element. That
is, it was classically held that a reissue would not be per-
mitted to enlarge the claims of an original patent by includ-
ing matter once intentionally omitted.7 The substantive law
4 See Dobson v. Lees, 137 U.S. 258, 265 (1890).
5 See Leggett v. Avery, 101 U.S. 256, 259 (1880); Fiberjoint
Corp. v. W. R. Meadows, Inc., 112 F.2d 322, 326, 45 U.S.P.Q.
632 (7th Cir. 1940); In re Wadsworth, 107 F.2d 596, 600, 43
U.S.P.Q. 460 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
6 See Riley v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 217 F.2d 530 (9th
Cir. 1940). Some cases continue to apply this principle
under the 1952 statute, e.g., In re French, 89 F.2d 662, re-
hearing 90 F.2d 113, 114, 33 U.S.P.Q. 374, 537 (C.C.P.A. 1937).
7 Cases cited supra, n. 5; Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593,
597, 598 (1886); Dill Mfg. Co. v. J. W. Speaker Corp., 179
F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 ( );
Mercoid Corp. v. Milwaukee Gas Specialty Co., 119 F.2d
370 (7th Cir. 1941), affg 33 F. Supp. 681, 684 (E.D. Wis.
1940); Hummel and Downing Co. v. Hinde and Dauch Paper
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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so laid down afforded the public a large measure of protec-
tion against fraud.
These decisions afforded the public less protection against
a situation in which an original applicant would feature two
or more elements, in order to obtain an original patent, and
then omit only one of those elements for purposes of a re-
issue. That is, if an original applicant would insert in his origi-
nal claims a critical element plus some additional verbiage,
then he might escape the impact of these decisions and omit
the element by contending during the reissue proceedings that
it was really the verbiage that motivated the allowance of the
original. If in his original argument for allowance of the orig-
inal the applicant argued not only the merits of the really
critical element, but also the merits of another element or two,
he had some prospect of escaping the impact of these old
decisions.
After the case law on reissues was fairly settled, a new
patent statute was substituted for the old in the patent law
codification and revision popularly known as the Patent Act
of 1952.8
The new reissue statute, as judicially interpreted, has fav-
Co., 272 F. 812, 814 (7th Cir. 1921). The traditional doctrine
was recently followed in Haliczer v. United States, 356 F.2d
541, 148 U.S.P.Q. 565 (Ct. Cl. 1966). In that case the origi-
nal patentee relied on side edges to obtain the original pat-
ent and the accused device lacked such side edges. The
court held invalid the additional claims added by reissue
because the omitted edges had motivated the examiner to
allow the original patent. The claims added by reissue were
substantially the same as claims surrendered by applicant
during prosecution of the original patent.
8 Section 1 of the Act, 66 Stat. 792, enacts Title 35 of the
United States Code into positive law.
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ored reissues so strongly as inadequately to protect the public.9
Let us consider the wording of the new statute and the trend
of the decisions since 1952, particularly with reference to the
kind of error required as a basis for a reissue of the type in
which an element or relation, commonly referred to as a "lim-
itation," is omitted in the broadened reissue claim.
The report of the Committee on the Judiciary, accompany-
ing the House Bill enacted into law as the Patent Act of 1952,10
insists that the purpose of the new reissue statute was to "re-
place the present one, making a number of clarifications and
a few additions in further development of the subject." While
this is an indication that no substantial change was intended,
the courts have held otherwise.
9 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 251 provides as follows:
Whenever any patent is, through error
without any deceptive intention, deemed
wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by
reason of a defective specification or drawing,
or by reason of the patentee claiming more
or less than he had a right to claim in the pat-
ent, the commissioner shall, on the surrender
of such patent and the payment of the fee
required by law, reissue the patent for the in-
vention disclosed in the original patent, and
in accordance with a new and amended appli-
cation, for the unexpired part of the term of
the original patent. No new matter shall be
introduced into the application for reissue.
The provisions of this title relating to ap-
plications for patent shall be applicable to ap-
plication for reissue of a patent, except that
application for reissue may be made a n d
sworn to by the assignee of the entire interest
if the application does not seek to enlarge the
scope of the claims of the original patent.
No reissued patent shall be granted enlarg-
ing the scope of the claims of the original pat-
ent unless applied for within two years from
the grant of the original patent.
10 H.R. 1923, 8, 45, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). Cf. S. 1979,
7. 82nd Cong., 2d Sess.
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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Examination of the language of the old and new statutes
detects some changes, significant in semantics, and greatly
magnified as judicially construed in recent decisions. The more
significant of these changes are indicated by this tabulation:
OLD
The error must have arisen by
inadvertence, accident or mis-
take and without any fraudu-
lent or deceptive intention.
The patent must be wholly or
partly inoperative or invalid.
The ground for reissue must be
a defective or insufficient spe-
cification or the difficulty must
arise because of the patentee
claiming as his own invention
or discovery more than he had
a right to claim as new.
The reissue patent must be for
the same invention, and in ac-
cordance with the corrected
specification.
No new matter shall be intro-
duced into the specification, nor
in the case of a machine patent
shall the model or drawing be
amended, except each by the
other; but when there is neither
model nor drawing amend-
ments may be made upon proof
satisfactory to the commission-
er that such new matter or
amendment was a part of the
original invention and was
omitted from the specification
by inadvertence, accident or
mistake.
The specification and claims
shall be subject to revision and
restriction in the same manner
as original applications.
NEW
The defect in the patent must
have arisen through error with-
out any deceptive intention.
The patent must be "deemed"
SO.
A defective or insufficient spe-
cification or drawing, the pat-
entee claiming more or less
than he had a right to claim in
the patent."
The reissue patent must be for
the invention disclosed in the
original patent and in accord-
ance with a new and amended
application.
No new matter shall be intro-
duced into the application for
reissue.
The provisions relating to ap-
plications for patent shall be
applicable to applications for
reissue.
No reissued patent shall be
granted enlarging the scope of
the claims of the original patent
unless applied for within two
years from the grant of the
original patent.12
1 This was a statutory confirmation of a well established in-
terpretation of the old reissue statute.
12 Prior to the 1952 statute the decisions, by analogy to the
statutory bar applicable to original patent applications, gen-
erally applied the same time limitation to broadened claims
of a reissue, at least in the absence of excuse.
1968]
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The changes in the reissue statute have prompted many
questions which have not yet been authoritatively decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States.13 A fundamental ques-
tion, to which this paper principally attends, is whether the
expression "through error, and without deceptive intention"
excuses the classic requirement that the reissue defect arise
through inadvertence, accident or mistake.
Heretofore the requirement was that inadvertence, acci-
dent or mistake be extrinsic. That is, the mere fact that an
original patentee claimed less than he might have claimed
did not of itself constitute the requisite inadvertence, accident
or mistake. The requirement of the classic decisions was that
the error arise through inadvertence, accident or mistake.
However, decisional law under the new patent statute affords
some support to those who contend that the mere failure to
claim supplies the requisite inadvertence, accident or mistake.
Of principal concern to the courts and to the patent pro-
fession is the broadened type of reissue, that is, a reissue pat-
ent in which the claims cover products, for example, that the
original patent did not embrace. Suppose that the claims of
an original patent are limited to a combination embracing ele-
ments designated A, B, C, D and E. Assume further that the
patent owner learns that a competitor is making a structure
which omits both the element E and its function. It is clear
law that if the original patent disclosed the combination A-D
together with an intention to claim it, if the failure to obtain
a claim on that combination was due to inadvertence, acci-
dent or mistake, if the subject matter of that combination was
13 For a discussion of intervening rights, i.e., the defensive
rights accruing to one who begins the manufacture of an
accused device, covered by the broadened reissue claims,
prior to the reissue, see generally Silverman, To Err is
Human-Patent Reissues and the Doctrine of Intervening
Rights, 48 JouRNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE SocIETY 696 (1966),
which also discusses additional reissue cases decided under
the 1952 statute.
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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not deliberately abandoned during the prosecution of the ori-
ginal, and further if the combination A-D patentably distin-
guishes over the prior art, then the owner may obtain a re-
issue.
The issue of intrinsic vel extrinsic mistake is of primary
importance. Also worthy of consideration are such questions
as whether or not an applicant can avoid the effect of a mis-
take made by his attorney and whether or not a mistake of
judgment still precludes reissue.
Occasionally a reissue type defect is discovered before an
original patent issues. The question arises as to the impact
on the applicant of failure to invoke any alternative remedies
that may be available to him at the time of the discovery of
the error, such, for example as a continuation patent applica-
tion, a suspension, or an amendment under Rule 312 of the
Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office.
Defects which motivate applications for reissue arise from
a wide variety of circumstances. It is commonly alleged that
the attorney who prosecuted the original patent did not under-
stand the invention. Perhaps he credited the prior art with
more than it really discloses. He might have inadvertently
given undue weight to an unessential element of the embodi-
ment of the disclosed invention. Occasionally there is lack of
adequate contact with the inventor. Economic considerations
may prompt the applicant to accept a claim or two and cause
the patent promptly to be issued. If at the time the applicant
did not perceive or appreciate that a broader and patentable
claim could properly have been presented, a question arises
as to whether the action of cancelling all unallowed claims
forecloses any opportunity for a reissue involving such a
proper claim.
Indeed there are many sets of circumstances which justify
a bona fide reissue and give rise to liberal decisions which
furnish appropriate precedents to like cases. However, the
new reissue statute has been construed with gross liberality
19681
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and the tendency to view decisional law with universality
indicates that the gate is being opened wide to the reforma-
tion of patents which the reissue statute was not intended
to reform. The decisions tend in the direction of a doctrine
which would permit the owner of a well-prosecuted patent,
who on inspection of an after-devised structure finds that the
claims did not cover it but that the state of the prior art per-
mits presentation of a claim generic to both the invention
disclosed in the original patent and such structure, to return
to the Patent Office, retain the claims that he has, and obtain
claims of broader scope for no reason other than mere failure
of the original claims to cover a similar structure made by
another.
Reissue patent applications should be viewed with strict
scrutiny and not with liberality for reasons springing both
from the motivations for reissue and from the mechanics of
Patent Office practice.
Whenever an original patentee perceives that it is possible
to define both the structure he discloses and an accused de-
vice, generically, without being impeded by the prior art, the
question arises as to whether the patentee is teaching the
generic to the art or whether the accused device taught him.
Whenever the failure of the claims of an original patent to
cover an accused device motivates the reissue, there is a nat-
ural query as to whether the teaching sought to be protected
by the reissue patent springs from the original patent or from
the accused device.
Too often an applicant returns to the Patent Office with
his old claims and claims of broader scope, accompanied by
an oath signed by the inventor and averring that the error
was failure to obtain claims of broader scope. While oaths of
this nature are often pro forma and rarely mention the ac-
cused device in a candid manner,14 the additional claims pre-
14 In A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Affiliated Gas Equip., Inc., 107 F.
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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sented with the reissue application are at least supported by
some kind of verification. But since the claims are subjected
to revision, amendment, substitution and restriction during
the prosecution of the reissue patent, the additional claims
finally appearing in a reissue are frequently supported by
no oath at all!
It has been cynically asserted that claims, whether in an
original or in a reissue patent, are analagous to globules of
mercury which slide around on the surface of the issue be-
tween the applicant and the examiner and fall into whatever
holes the prior art will allow. The actual operation of the
reissue statute, therefore, is to permit the patentee to go
through the prosecution procedure for the second time, to
start out with reissue claims supported by an ex parte self-
serving oath, and to end up with claims covering the accused
Supp. 251, 96 U.S.P.Q. 94 (D. Texas 1953), ajfd on other
grounds, 205 F.2d 654, 98 U.S.P.Q. 169 (5th Cir 1953), the
court struck down a reissue patent which incorporated new
matter in the form of a drawing. The court held that the
incorporation of the new matter, together with an exchange
of blueprints with reference to the parties' structures prior
to application for reissue, estopped the plaintiff. However,
in Ex parte Allwein, 99 U.S.P.Q. 177 (Bd. Pat. App. 1953),
claims were allowed to an applicant for reissue which dorn-
inated the structure of an adversely held patent issuing
after the original patent; the claims were of the "inter-
mediate scope" type, i.e., broader than those in the original,
narrower than those cancelled during prosecution of the
original. The fact that cases turn on issues of this kind in-
dicates that coverage of a device aliunde the patent is a
factor which ought to be set forth in the reissue oath, but
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device and unsupported by any oath.1 i Too often the courts
and the United States Patent Office have attempted to re-
write the reissue statute as follows:
If an applicant does not obtain claims in the
original patent which will adequately cover
an accused device that he later sees, which
accused device has a community of novelty
and unobviousness with the disclosure of the
'5 35 U.S.C. § 132 is applicable to reissues and recognizes the
right of the applicant to respond to an office action and to
file new or amended claims. See also Rules 65, 111-123,
and 176 of the Rules of Practice of the United States Pat-
ent Office (1965 ed.) Particular attention is invited to Rule
175, which reads as follows:
Reissue oath or declaration. (a) Applicants
for reissue, in addition to complying with the
requirements of the first sentence of Rule 65,
must also file with their applications a state-
ment under oath or declaration as follows:
(1) That applicant verily believes the orig-
inal patent to be wholly or partly inoperative
or invalid, and the reasons why.
(2) When it is claimed that such patent is
so inoperative or invalid "by reason of a de-
fective specification or drawing," particularly
specifying such defects.
(3) When it is claimed that such patent is
inoperative or invalid "by reason of the pat-
entee claiming more or less than he had a
right to claim in the patent," distinctly speci-
fying the excess or insufficiency in the claims.
(4) Particularly specifying the errors re-
lied upon, and how they arose or occurred.
(5) That said errors arose "without any de-
ceptive intention" on the part of the applicant.
(b) Corroborating affidavits of others may
be filed and the examiner may, in any case,
require additional information or affidavits
concerning the application for reissue and its
object.
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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patent, then the patentee can return to the
Patent Office and receive an award of addi-
tional claims adequate to cover that device
even though the claims finally awarded are
not directly supported by any oath.
Too often does a reissue applicant bring the original pat-
ent to issue with intent to file a reissue. Too often does a pat-
entee, originally well satisfied with his patent, apply for a re-
issue in order to provoke an interference with a later issued
patent.
The reissue statute does not declare that every patentee
has the right to return to the Patent Office and obtain by re-
issue whatever claims the prior art permits. The true inten-
tion of the reissue statute was to permit him to obtain the
award of only those claims founded on disclosed subject mat-
ter, which claims he manifested an intention to obtain and
which claims correspond conceptually to his a priori teachings.
It is not the intention of the reissue statute to permit him to
direct claims to the generic that he extracts ex posteriori from
a later examined accused device.
Review of the decisions since the enactment of the Patent
Act of 1952 establishes an urgent need for a current considera-
tion of the reissue statute by the Supreme Court of the United
States and an interpretation of the reissue statute that will
discourage this sequence of events: Dissatisfaction with a pat-
ent, followed by nominal ex parte showings of reissue "de-
fects," followed in turn by a second prosecution in the Pat-
ent Office terminating with additional claims relating to gen-
eric concepts never taught by the patentee, all without any
showing as to the absence of such claims from the original
patent being due to inadvertence, accident or mistake.
The need for another look at the reissue statute becomes
even more impressive when re-reissues are considered.
The minimum thesis of this paper is that claims finally
allowed in a reissue should be supported by a supplemental
oath and the Patent Office, by rule, should so require. Addi-
1968]
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tionally, both the inventor and the attorney should be sub-
ject to inquiry by deposition and interrogatories propounded
by the examiner, so that a full and candid explanation of the
true basis for reissue may be spread on the public record.10
Even under the new reissue statute the cases seem to be
in agreement that if, during the prosecution of an original
patent, a claim is presented and then cancelled, that precise
claim cannot be obtained by reissue. However, the element-
16 The author submits that Rule 175 (b) should be rigorously
enforced and that a supplemental oath should be required
with respect to any allowed claim coverage in the reissue
departing in any way from the claims filed with the re-
issue application. Cf. Rule 67, which reads as follows:
Supplemental oath or declaration for mat-
ter not originally claimed. (a) When an ap-
plicant presents a claim for matter originally
shown or described but not substantially em-
braced in the statement of invention or claim
originally presented, he shall file a supple-
mental oath or declaration to the effect that
the subject matter of the proposed amend-
ment was part of his invention; that he does
not know and does not believe that the same
was ever known or used before his invention
or discovery thereof, or patented or described
in any printed publication in any country be-
fore his invention or discovery thereof, or
more than one year before his application, or
in public use or on sale in the United States
for more than one year before the date of
his legal representatives or assigns more than
twelve months prior to his application in the
United States, and has not been abandoned.
Such supplemental oath or declaration should
accompany and properly identify the pro-
posed amendment, otherwise the proposed
amendment may be refused consideration.
(b) In proper cases the oath or declara-
tion here required may be made on informa-
tion and belief by an applicant other than
inventor.
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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omitting type of reissue claim is frequently granted if it is
narrower in scope than a cancelled original claim directed to
the same combination. The decisions do not define with pre-
cision the acts, intentions, and conduct which constitute final
abandonment of subject matter beyond recoupment by reissue.
Many questions remain unresolved under the new pat-
ent statute. Does the execution of decision to accept a claim
or two, and to bring the original patent to issue without ad-
ditional investment, constitute a conclusive and final abandon-
ment of all unclaimed subject matter? What about subject mat-
ter actually patentably distinct from the prior art on a ground
not then within the comprehension of the attorney? Or the in-
ventor? If at an interview following final rejection the attorney
agrees with the examiner to accept a limitation in claims as
a condition for allowance, does he then irretrievably abandon
subject matter not characterized by such limitation? Does it
make any difference whether the examiner is in error as to
his view of the prior art?
Not only do the decisions under the new patent statute
render uncertain the state of the law that was once fairly well
established, but so often the records of original patent pro-
ceedings are silent with respect to the precise circumstances
under which arose the defects that are complained of in re-
issues, compounding uncertainties for the Patent Office, for
attorneys, and for prospective defendants.
Nor is the law so clearly defined as it should be with re-
spect to the steps that an applicant must take during the
prosecution of the original patent when he discovers an un-
necessary element in a combination claim.
What course must an applicant pursue during the prose-
cution of the original patent if he discovers a reissue-type de-
fect? If the notice of allowance has been received, must he
file a continuation patent application, or apply for additional
claim coverage under Rule 312 of the Rules of Practice of the
United States Patent Office? Assume that he has ample op-
19681
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portunity to pursue either course, but fails to do so. Is this
a conclusive abandonment of his reissue equity, on the theory
that the defect, if any, then appearing in the original patent,
arises deliberately and not through error? The more significant
decisions interpreting the new reissue statute are here exam-
ined with these inquiries also in mind.
The early impression that the new reissue statute made
no substantive change was reinforced by several decisions.
The fact pattern of Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou John-
son Co., Inc.1 7 involved a situation in which the original claims
were obtained in good faith and were held valid in a jury
trial. In the interim between appeal and final decision the
Supreme Court struck down claims, cast in terms of ultimate
functionality, in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company
v. Walker.18 On appeal the Halliburton decision was followed
and the claims declared functional and invalid. The patentee
obtained a reissue on the ground that the functional char-
acter of the original claims could not have been foreseen when
the original issued. In the principal case the District Court
summarily held the reissue to be invalid on the ground that,
as a matter of law, failure to anticipate a court decision does
not constitute error within the meaning of the reissue statute.
The United States Court of Appeals reversed on the
grounds that the patentee acted in good faith, had been vindi-
cated in the jury trial, and that the Halliburton decision was
surprising. The failure of appellant to foresee that a claim
would be invalid in litigation, for functionality, is a reissue
type error when the functional character of the claim is not
obvious.
Note that while the reissue of a patent has classically
been regarded as analogous to the reformation of contract, the
17 Moist Cold Refrigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 217 F.2d
39, 103 U.S.P.Q. 410 (9th Cir. 1954).
18 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 320 U.S.
1, 71 U.S.P.Q. 175 (1946).
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Court of Appeals departed from the analogy by treating a
mistake of law as ground for a reissue. However, the most
significant pronouncement of the court was that the test as
to the type of error required to warrant reissue under the
new statute remains the same as under the old. In effect, the
court reads the words "inadvertence, accident and mistake"
into the new patent statute.
The same court promptly struck down a reissue in Riley
v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc.19 again insisting that the test
as to the type of error required to warrant reissue is the
same under the new reissue statute as under the old. Here
the original patent issued with claims directed to shoulder
pads including voids. The reissue added claims to shoulder
pads without voids even though claims for shoulder pads with-
out voids had been deliberately abandoned during the origi-
nal prosecution. The court held that the subject matter of the
reissue claims was deliberately abondoned and that no error
through inadvertence, accident or mistake could have existed.
The court met the argument that the abandoned claims differ-
ed materially from the reissue claims by declaring that in ef-
fect the chief aspect of the reissue claims was the omission
of the voids. The court left open the question as to the extent
of the deviation between newly added reissue claims and
abandoned claims which might be permitted.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals gave support
to the doctrine that no substantial change in the nature of a
reissue type error was intended in the case of In re Byers,20
where it squarely held that the words "through error" mean
"through inadvertence, accident or mistake." The same type
of error is necessary to justify reissue after enactment of the
Patent Act of 1952 as before. In the Byers case a claim gen-
erally corresponding to a reissue claim was abandoned dur-
ing the original prosecution. The reissue claim was broader
19 Riley v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra, n. 6.
20 230 F.2d 451, 109 U.S.P.Q. 53 (1956).
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in certain respects but not narrower in any respect. The re-
issue claim was broader in scope than the protection which
would have been afforded if that abandoned claim had been
allowed as originally presented. While the original claim was
not in fact abandoned and was amended in order to obtain
its allowance, the decision is on the hypothetical footing that
the claim was cancelled and that a new claim including limita-
tions corresponding to the amendment was substituted. This
action was held to be a bar to the reissue of the claim as it
originally stood or any equivalent claim of broader scope.
This case stands for the rule that the deliberate withdrawal
or amendment of a claim in order to obtain the original pat-
ent does not involve inadvertence, accident or mistake. Addi-
tionally, since the deliberate cancellation of the claim con-
stituted a bar to the obtaining of the same claim by reissue,
it likewise constitutes a bar to the allowance of any claim
which differs from that cancelled only in being broader.
In contrast to these holdings reference is made to obser-
vations made by the Honorable Giles S. Rich in a November
6, 1952, address before the New York Patent Law Association.
Mr. Rich, a distinguished patent attorney, is quoted as follows:
Section 251 on reissue drops that famous
old 'inadvertence, accident, or mistake,' and
what it substitutes for it is very broad lan-
guage. The more one thinks about it, the more
it grows. It says that reissue may be had if the
patent is inoperative or invalid, 'through er-
ror without any deceptive intention'--Query:
Is this broad enough to cover the ill-advised,
slipshod or stupid cancellation of claims from
an application by an attorney? Is his act go-
ing to be binding on a subsequent attorney?
I do not see why it should not be broad
enough to cover that situation, because what
the section says later on is indicative of the
purpose of reissue. Let me rephrase it. The
purpose of the section appears to be to give
the applicant what 'he had a right to claim';
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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and if he does not have it, by reason of error
of some kind, then he should be able to get it
by reissue. (New Rule 175 does not seem to
include anything contrary to such an inter-
pretation but there is a large body of prece-
dent to be overcome.)
Realistically, unlike the present statute,
Sec. 251 says that you can reissue where the
defect is due to the fact that the patentee has
claimed either more or less than he had a
right to claim.
Now, the changes that you can make in a
reissue are stated in rather involved language
in the present statute, but here it merely re-
fers to filing a 'new and amended application,'
and the only restriction on it is that there
shall be 'no new matter.'
Another innovation is that an assignee may
apply for reissue without the inventor and
swear to the application, if it is not a broaden-
ing reissue. If it is a broadening reissue, the
inventor's signature is required. (New Rule
172.)
The last paragraph codifies two years as the
maximum time within which to apply for a
broadening reissue, and no excuses will ex-
tend that maximum because it is no longer
merely a court-made rule, derived by analogy
from other statutes. It is written into the law
in positive form. In subsequent bills it was ex-
tended to two years. It is my recollection that
what the Coordinating Committee thought it
was doing at the time was to give everybody
two years within which to apply for a broad-
ening reissue. The note under Sec. 251 might
tend to carry that idea out.
Classically, the acts of the attorney have been deemed to
be the acts of the applicant. However, there is noted in Mc-
Cullough Tool Company v. Well Surveys, Inc.21 particularly
21 199 F. Supp. 374, 131 U.S.P.Q. 179 (N.D. Okla. 1961), 343
F.2d 381, 145 U.S.P.Q. 6 (10th Cir. 1965).
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in the District Court opinion, a tendency to permit reissue
unless the inventor has personally authorized cancellation of
those claims in the original which are asserted to constitute
abandoned subject matter.
The cases in which the reissue-type defects are discovered
before issue of the original patent are of particular interest.
In Ex parte CampbeIl2 2 the reissue claim was first pre-
sented under what was then Rule 78,2 but was neither enter-
ed nor considered on the merits. The primary examiner re-
fused to allow it in the reissue proceedings on the ground that
there could have been no inadvertence, accident or mistake
in failing to obtain such a claim in the original. The Board of
Appeals reversed on the ground that the applicant had, by
the Rule 78 amendment, exhausted every possible remedy and
had not abandoned the subject matter.
In Ex parte Nehls 24 the final fee for the original patent
had been paid and the application had been assigned a patent
date and number. Under these circumstances, the mere fact
that the inventor discovered the reissue type "errors" before
22 53 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Bd. Patent App. 1942).
23 The rules of practice before the Patent Office were sub-
stantially revised after the enactment of the Patent Act
of 1952. Rule 78, in effect prior to the revision, provided:
Amendments after the notice of allowance
of an application will not be permitted as a
matter of right, but may be made, if the speci-
fication has not been printed, on the recom-
mendation of the primary examiner, approv-
ed by the Commissioner, without withdraw-
ing the case from issue.
The question arises as to the reason for the failure of the
original applicant in Ex parte Campbell, supra, n. 22, to
file a continuation application. Patent Office practice er-
roneously did not permit continuations at the time the
Campbell decision was rendered. See text accompanying
n.28, infra.
24 139 U.S.P.Q. 96 (Bd. Patent App. 1963).
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the patent issued would not preclude reissue because the orig-
inal patentee had no opportunity to rectify the insufficiency
prior to issuance of the patent.
The above cases should be compared with Ex parte Ziher 25
in which the defect was discovered before payment of the
final fee. The applicant filed a petition under Rule 31720 for
delayed payment of the final fee and accompanied it with an
amendment. Entry of the amendment was refused but the
petition for the delayed payment of the final fee was accept-
ed and the original patent issued. The Board of Appeals re-
fused to grant a reissue on the ground that the patentee should,
at the time of the petition, have requested suspension of issue
of the patent under Rule 31427 and filed a continuation patent
application to include the claims presented thereafter in the
25 116 U.S.P.Q. 162 (Bd. Patent App. 1957).
26 At that time Rule 317 read as follows:
Delayed payment of final fee. The Com-
missioner of Patents may, in his discretion,
receive the final fee if paid within one year
after the six months' period for payment has
passed and the patent shall issue as specified
in rule 314. Each petition for the delayed pay-
ment of the final fee shall be accompanied
by the final fee and the petition fee, and a
verified statement in support of the petition.
27 At that time Rule 314 read as follows:
Issuance of Patent. Every patent shall issue
within a period of three months from the date
of the payment of the final fee, which fee shall
be paid not later than six months from the
date on which the application was allowed
and the notice of allowance sent; and if the
final fee be not paid within that period, the
patent shall be withheld. In the absence of re-
quest to suspend issue of the patent up to
three months, the patent will issue in regular
course in about one month. The issue closes
weekly on Thursday, and the patents ordi-
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reissue application. The patentee accepted the original patent
without "erring."
The composite doctrine of this group of cases is that an
original patentee who discovers the "error" before the patent
issues is bound to exhaust every remedy open to him at the
time the "error" is discovered in order to prevent issuance
of an original patent containing the error.
The case of Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Avco Manufac-
turing Corporation28 initiated a strong trend in favor of re-
28 126 F. Supp. 595, 103 U.S.P.Q. 120 (N.D. Ill. 1954), aff'd,
227 F.2d 137, 107 U.S.P.Q. 187 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 987 (1956).
Finding No. 6 in the opinion of the trial court applies
the wording of the 1952 statute to the conduct of the pat-
entee in 1940:
After the issuance of aforesaid original Pat-
ent 2,227,815 it was called to Toulon's atten-
tion that in several respects the patent was
"through error and without any deceptive in-
tention, deemed * * * partly inoperative * * *
by reason of a defective specification" and
"by reason of the patentee claiming * * * less
than he had a right to claim in the patent".
Therefore, he authorized the filing of an ap-
plication under 35 U.S.C. § 251 (35 U.S.C. §
64, 1946 ed.) to reissue his original Patent
2,227,815 to correct such defects, and such ap-
plication w as duly filed under Serial No.
390,212 and duly issued March 24, 1942 as Pat-
ent Re. 22,055, in suit.
126 F. Supp. at 598.
Section 1 of the Patent Act of July 19, 1952, 66 Stat. 792,
codifies Title 35 of the United States Code into positive
law. Section 4 (a) of that Act, 66 Stat. 815, provides:
This Act shall take effect on January 1,
1953, and shall apply to all applications for
patents filed on or after such date and to all
patents granted on such applications. It shall
apply to further proceedings on applications
pending on such date and to patents granted
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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issues and was decided under the new reissue statute, even
though the original and reissue patents had issued under the
on such applications except as otherwise pro-
vided. It shall apply to unexpired patents
granted prior to such date except as other-
wise provided.
Section 4(a) of the Act, 66 Stat. 815, provides:
Nothing contained in Title 35, as enacted
by section I hereof, shall operate to nullify
any judicial finding prior to the effective date
of this Act on the validity of any patent by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 5 of the Act, 66 Stat. 815, repeals the sections of
prior statutes set out in a schedule of satutes repealed and
provides: "Any rights or liabilities now existing under such
sections or parts thereof shall not be affected by this repeal."
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that:
The 1952 statute, rather than the prior law,
governs this case because we are here consid-
ering an unexpired patent which is covered
by section 4(a) of the 1952 enactment, which
provides:
"This Act shall take effect on January 1,
1953, and * * *. It shall apply to unexpired
patents granted prior to such date except as
otherwise provided."
See, to the same effect, Lyon v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 2 Cir., 1955, 224 F.2d 530
[106 U.S.P.Q. 1] and Pacific Contact Labora-
tories v. Solex Laboratories, 9 Cir., 1953, 209
F.2d 529 [100 U.S.P.Q. 12].
227 F.2d at 144 (footnotes omitted).
Avco and Bausch & Lomb invoked section 5 in their
unsuccessful petitions for certiorari, and the question rais-
ed in the conflicting decisions was not decided on the merits
by the United States Supreme Court.
Retroactive application of the 1952 patent act has been
denied under section 5 in the following cases: Texas-Miller
Hat Corp. v. Switzer Bros., Inc., 201 F.2d 824, 825 (5th Cir.
1953); General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 203 F.2d
912,917 (6th Cir. 1953); Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co.,
16 F.R.D. 141, 145 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Diebold, Inc. v. Record
Files, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 375, 376 (N.D. Ohio 1953). See also
United States v. Burr, 159 U.S. 78 (1895).
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old statute and even though the complaint was filed in 1951.
The Hazeltine case is of particular interest in that the
Cerrors" were discovered at a time when the original patent
application had been forfeited for non-payment of the final
fee. It was stipulated that the determination of the advisability
of filing a reissue application was made by the inventor's con-
tingent assignee before the original patent issued. Avco urged,
unsuccessfully, that Hazeltine (which was to take title upon
filing of the reissue) abandoned unclaimed subject matter
by failing, before the original issued, to invoke a remedy of
grace for correction of defects and that the representatives
of the inventor-assignor should have accompanied the petition
for delayed payment of the final fee with an amendment
presenting broadened claims, under Rule 78 of the then ex-
isting Rules of Practice, corresponding to Rule 312 of the cur-
rent Patent Office Rules of Practice.
The contention was made at a time prior to the decision
in Ex parte Ziherl. It was clear at the time that had the in-
ventor-assignor in the Hazeltine case invoked the Rule 78
proceeding, merely bringing the original patent to issue after
discovery of defects would not have constituted an abandon-
ment of unclaimed subject matter, under the doctrine of the
Ex parte Campbell case.
The timetable of events in the Hazeltine case is worthy
of attention. On November 21, 1939, the Patent Office mailed
a Notice of Allowance. At that time the original patent appli-
cation stood allowed with four claims, each directed to a com-
bination including the element referred to as "sync transform-
ing means." On May 21, 1940, the patent application became
forfeited for nonpayment of the final fee. While the appli-
cation was in a forfeited condition, on or about September
12, 1940, it was purchased, contingent upon reinstatement of
the original patent application and application for reissue. It
was stipulated in the case that the "defects" in the original
patent, set forth in the application for reissue, were discov-
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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ered just prior to September 12, 1940. The original patent is-
sued on January 7, 1941. It so happened that one of the Hazel-
tine engineers independently devised a synchronizing system
which Hazeltine considered to be substantially similar to and
the equivalent of that described in the original Toulon patent
application. However, the allowed claims did not cover that
independently devised synchronizing system, and Hazeltine
concluded, several months before the original patent issued,
that it would be advisable to reissue it. The original claims
did not cover the Loughren device because it was a combina-
tion without the sync transforming means.
The question immediately arose as to whether the defects
arose through inadvertence, accident or mistake or purposely.
29
29 The district court made no affirmative finding that the er-
rors arose through inadvertence, accident or mistake; it did
find that the record failed to establish misrepresentation
or concealment. The court's finding is quoted in note 28
supra.
The trial court's finding that Toulon authorized a re-
issue to be filed and its use of the wording of a statute
which did not then exist is understood to imply that the
new reissue statute is in substance and meaning the same
as the old. This was the position taken by plaintiff in a
brief in the trial court against the granting of a summary
judgment. On appeal, however, plaintiff argued:
However, the question of "inadvertence,
accident, or mistake" is no longer the criterion
for testing the legality of a reissue patent. The
Reissue Statute in force since 1953 ... is more
liberal in that it requires only that the defect
in the original patent occur "through error
and without any deceptive intention" (35
U.S.C. § 251).
In short, the court found that the record failed to estab-
lish deceptive intention, and it did not rule on whether
the error had to arise by inadvertence, accident or mis-
take. The court of appeals also did not expressly rule on
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The district court made a specific finding that the "errors
arose without deceptive intention."30 However, neither court
clearly held that the defects arose through inadvertence, ac-
cident or mistake.
30 See note 28 supra.
The court of appeals' opinion in Hazeltine cites cases
which would lead one to conclude not only that the record
failed to show any misrepresentation or deceptive intention,
but even if it had, that a defense on the ground of decep-
tive intention which does not appear on the face of the
patent will not be heard. See Walker Process Equip., Inc.
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 147 U.S.P.Q.
404 (1965); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive
Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 65 U.S.P.Q. 133 (1945);
Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 61
U.S.P.Q. 241 (1944); Keystone Drilling Co. v. General Ex-
cavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 19 U.S.P.Q. 228 (1933); Randolph
Labs., Inc. v. Specialties Dev. Corp., 199 F.2d 680 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 910 (1953); Mas v. Coca Cola
Co., 198 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1952); Mas v. Coca Cola Co.,
163 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1947); Monolith Portland Midwest
Co. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 128 F. Supp. 824, 855
(S.D. Cal. 1955); Wooldridge Mfg. Co. v. R. G. LeTourneau,
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
Whenever it appears that the occasion for reissue was
to broaden the claims to cover not only the invention of
the original patent but also the invention of another, close
scrutiny seems required. The finding by both the district
court and the court of appeals that the invention of the
Toulon reissue patent was the same invention as that of
the original patent was based on substantial evidence and
was a holding that the occasion for the reissue was to
broaden the claims more effectively to claim the Toulon
invention. It can be argued, particularly on the basis of
the decision of Judge Wyzanski in United States v Stan-
dard Elec. Time Co., 155 F. Supp. 949, 116 U.S.P.Q. 14 (D.
Mass. 1957), that the reissue applicant has no duty to dis-
close the fact that an occasion for the reissue is to cover
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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For reasons explained in Ex parte Ziherl, 1 the decision,
if any, of the purchaser not to file a continuation patent ap-
plication would not then have constituted a bar to reissue.
However, an interesting question, urged in the trial court but
not discussed in either opinion, was presented by reason of
the failure to accompany the petition for delayed payment of
the final fee by an amendment adding additional claims of
the type later sought by reissue. On that point it was the
contention of Hazeltine that no administrative remedy of grace
was available and that the purchaser had only one course of
action open to it, to-wit: reissue. On the other hand, the de-
fendant contended that a remedy of grace existed, and that
an invention of another which happens to be similar or
is deemed to be the equivalent of that of the reissue ap-
plicant. The philosophy of Judge Wyzansk's decision is
that an applicant should not be forced to set up what it
regards in good faith as a straw man which it reasonably
and in good faith believes that it can knock down. Paren-
thetically, however, there is much to be said for a specific
amendment to the Rules of Practice of the Patent Office
which would put the burden on the applicant for reissue
to reveal circumstances such as this in the reissue oath so
that even a question as to deceptive intention may be pre-
cluded from arising. When circumstances of this character
are stated in a reissue oath, the Patent Office examiner is
motivated to look with particular care into the question of
whether the original manifests on its face an intention to
claim the reissue subject matter, and further, since the
negation of deceptive intention is one of the requisites for
reissue, it should be competent for a defendant, if he has
any evidence bearing on this issue, to present it. Reissue
being an ex parte proceeding, the Rules of Practice should
be amended to require the applicant to establish freedom
from deceptive intention in a prophylactic manner. If all
of these considerations appear in a reissue oath and are
passed on by the Patent Office, then the need for them
to be considered by courts would be diminished.
81 See note 25 supra...
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by failure to invoke it, the patent owner waived the reissue
equity.3 2
32 Any reader who is interested in looking further into this




See also Commissioner of Patents Order No. 3311.
In each of these file wrappers a petition for acceptance
of delayed payment of the final fee was accompanied by
an amendment containing claims which thereby became in-
corporated in an issued original patent.
The following Patent Office Rules of Practice were in
effect in 1941:
77. Suspensions will only be granted for
good and sufficient cause, and for a reason-
able time specified. Only one suspension may
be granted by the primary examiner; any
further suspension must be approved by the
Commissioner ....
78. Amendments after the notice of allow-
ance of an application will not be permitted
as a matter of right, but may be made, if the
specification has not been printed, on the rec-
ommendation of the primary examiner, ap-
proved by the Commissioner, without with-
drawing the case from issue.
175. The Commissioner of Patents may in
his discretion receive the final fee if paid
within one year after the six months period
for payment has passed and the patent shall
issue. Each petition for the delayed payment
of the final fee shall be accompanied by the
final fee and the petition fee, and a verified
statement in support of the petition.
199. All cases not specifically defined and
provided for in these rules will be decided
in accordance with the merits of each case
under the authority of the Commissioner, and
such decision will be communicated to the in-
terested parties in writing.
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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In the Hazeltine case the court of appeals stated that the
1952 statute, "rather than" the prior law, applied to the re-
issue patent in suit. While the words "rather than" imply a
change, a petition for certiorari, on the ground of earlier cases
requiring inadvertence, accident or mistake, was not granted.
This expression "rather than" was used by the Court in the
context of a holding that the invention of the reissue was the
same invention as that disclosed in the original. Some light is
cast on this inquiry by dicta of the same court in Weller
Manufacturing Co. v .Wen Products, Inc.,33 where, in sustain-
ing a reissue patent, the court referred to the Hazeltine case
and then said:
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that an
applicant for reissue may fully describe his
original invention and include in his new de-
scription and claims not only what was de-
scribed before, but also what was suggested or
implied in the original drawings, specifica-
tions and models. Inasmuch as the justified
finding of the court was that the reissue pat-
ent included only the inherent function and
In Hazeltine's brief in the district court the cases involv-
ing the file wrappers mentioned above were referred to as
"involving very special circumstances requiring action on
petition to the Commissioner." This brings up the question
whether, under such circumstances, the original applicant
or purchaser was under a duty to petition the commis-
sioner. See note 25 supra. It must be conceded that the "ad-
ministrative remedy" on which Avco relied, if it existed,
was not notorious and seems to have been used only in
special circumstances. However, the suspension of prose-
cution under unusual circumstances was a well-known
remedy. But the Avco case was decided before the Ziherl
case, and the point was not presented. These questions,
with respect to the existence and non-use of an adminis-
trative remedy of grace, were not presented to the court
of appeals nor specifically discussed in the district court
opinion.
33 231 F.2d 795, 109 U.S.P.Q. 73 (7th Cir. 1956). See also Parker
& Whipple Co. v. Yale Clock Co., 123 U.S. 87 (1887).
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mode of operation of the original patent, it
follows that no new matter was introduced.
The cases cited by defendants in this connec-
tion, we think, are inapposite on their facts.8 4
These dicta would seem to imply a change when the lan-
guage is compared to that of the Supreme Court in United
States Industrial Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide and Carbon Chem-
ical Corp.:35
And it is not enough t h a t an invention
might have been claimed in the original pat-
ent because it was suggested or indicated in
the specification. It must appear from the face
of the instrument that what is covered by the
reissue was intended to have been covered
and secured by the original.
Each of the claims of the original Toulon patent was di-
rected to a combination including the sync transforming means
and during the prosecution, the applicant's attorney cancelled
a claim which did not include it. None of these claims was
of the same scope as those newly added by reissue. The Hazel-
tine case must be viewed on the footing that, as far as the
prior art was concerned, the newly added reissue claims de-
fined patentable subject matter. The decision is believed to
show a tendency in the direction of holding that, if the claims
of the original patent do not adequately cover the original,
that alone is a reissue type error, particularly when the sur-
rounding circumstances indicate a probability of error. This
view is derived from statements of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit that:
In accepting the original patent with only
the four claims allowed, Toulon's attorney,
Albert R. Hodges, erred. There is no evidence
indicating that either Toulson or Hodges at
any time had any intention to deceive. Decep-
84 231 F.2d at 800.
85 315 U.S. 668, 676 (1942).
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tive intention, like fraud, is never presumed.
.... Under these circumstances, a patent
was issued with claims whose breadth deviated
from those to which Toulon was entitled un-
der the invention which he disclosed. The
breadth of the claims therefore, through er-
ror, was incorrectly set forth and they, there-
fore, failed, as stated, to cover the scope of his
invention. Within that scope fell Loughren's
discovery.3 6
The decision appears to constitute a departure from de-
cisions under the old statute which held the applicant to be
bound by the judgment of his attorneys in accepting claims.
Prior to the Patent Act of 1952 errors of judgment by the at-
torney did not constitute a basis for reissue.30 7 It is believed
that the decision in Hazeltine implied that an error of judg-
ment is a reissue type error, and in that respect the decision
is a precedent for In re Wesseleres , discussed below, and ac-
cords with the view quoted above.
As will be pointed out below, the decisions are beginning
60 227 F.2d at 144-45.
'7 In the case of Dobson v. Lees, 137 U.S. 258, 265 (1890), the
Court said:
Nor, in the light of these protracted proceed-
ings in the Patent Office, can the applicant be
permitted to treat the deliberate acts of his
attorney as the result of inadverence, acci-
dent or mistake.
(Emphasis added.)
In General Radio Co. v. Allen B. Du Mont Laboratories,
Inc., 129 F.2d 608, 611 (3d Cir. 1942), the court cited Dobson
and said:
But an error of judgment, even though
made by the solicitor and not by the patentee
himself, is binding upon the patentee and may
not be rectified by a reissue patent.
(Footnote omitted.)
28 367 F.2d 838, 151 U.S.P.Q. 339 (C.C.P.A. 1966). See note
infra and accompanying text.
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to stand for a doctrine that the mere fact of inadequate cov-
erage of otherwise patentable subject matter is deemed to
justify a reissue. The difficulty of reconciling this doctrine
with the principle that unclaimed subject matter disclosed in
an original patent is abandoned is obvious. Can it be that pat-
entable but unclaimed subject matter in an original patent
is always eligible for recoupment by reissue? But even the
most liberal decisions have not yet declared this to be the
law. As previously indicated, the precise claim which was
cancelled during the original prosecution cannot be recover-
ed by reissue. But in this fact pattern there is an objective
standard to which one can adhere. As to unclaimed subject
matter beyond this limited ambit, the decisions put the prob-
lem in the subjective realm. In one case the original attorney
does not understand the invention and misses it in the orig-
inal claims. In another case the attorney understands the in-
vention and purposely emphasizes a specific element in order
to obtain allowance. In still a third case the examiner insists
that a particular element, or perhaps several elements, be in-
cluded in combination claims as a condition for allowance.
The query naturally arises as to the criteria which de-
termine, under the Patent Act of 1952, whether otherwise pat-
entable unclaimed subject matter is ever abandoned and if
so, under what circumstances. The casting of these problems
into the realm of the subjective is an additional reason why
all of the facts and circumstances prompting a reissue should
be detailed in the reissue oath and not solely in court opinions
illuminated by inter partes testimony which often shines in
fullness by comparison with the usual reissue oath. It has
been said that some patent proprietors, particularly prone to
reissue, employ reissue oaths of striking similitude. If one
argues that mere non-coverage of patentable subject matter
is sufficient, this argument is consistent with adoption of a
standard oath form or no oath at all and is reduced to ab-
surdity. Every inventor intends to obtain full coverage, and
instances of failing to obtain full coverage through deception
are unheard of.
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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The decisions have, since the turn of the century, swung
from rigorous criticism of many reissues as "patenteering" to
present treatment with great liberality.
The trend which began with Hazeltine gathered momen-
tum in a number of decisions in the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, culminating in the Wesseler decision which
motivated this paper.
In In re Schmidt9 the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals interpreted Section 116 of the Patent Act of 1952 which
permits misjoinder or non-joinder of an inventor to be cor-
rected if the "error arose without any deceptive intention
on his part." The court held that the "error" need not occur
through inadvertence or mistake and that the section would
be given too restricted a meaning if those words were im-
plied in it.
In the earlier decision in In re Willingham the court said:
The reissue provisions of the Patent Act of
1952, like the reissue provisions of the earlier
patent statutes, are remedial in nature. They
are based on fundamental principles of equity
and fairness and should be applied to the facts
in any given case so that justice will be done
both to the patentee and to the public.
The reissue claims under consideration were broader in
scope than an allowed claim in the original application, but
narrower than a cancelled claim therein. This is what is re-
ferred to as "an intermediate scope" type of case.
The Court also said:
35 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252 was enacted to provide
the present statutory basis for the granting of
reissues. These provisions differ in significant
respects from the prior reissue statute (R.S.
39 293 F.2d 274, 130 U.S.P.Q. 404 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
40 282 F.2d 353, 354-55, 127 U.S.P.Q. 211 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
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4916, 35 U.S.C. § 64). The differences perti-
nent to the present issue are found in Section
251 which authorizes a reissue to correct a
wholly or partially invalid or inoperative pat-
ent when due to "error without deceptive in-
tention," and if as a result of such error the
patentee has claimed less than he had a right
to claim.4
1
In re Byers42 was distinguished on the ground that in
Byers the amendments were deliberately and intentionally
made in order to secure the reissue, and on the further ground
that in Byers the reissue claim was broader than the cancelled
claim in the original application. Except for dicta in the case,
Willingham is not significant of a new trend.
In re Handel43 is worth mention at this point. For some
time there was a widely entertained impression that, both
under the new statute and the old statute, a reissue claim
would not be for the same invention if it added or subtracted
an element from a combination claim in the original. At least
there was a tendency to overemphasize this fact in various
attacks directed to reissues. Under both statutes it has, in fact,
been the law that it is error to look only to the claims of
the original and reissue patents in determining whether the
reissue claims are for the invention disclosed and intended
to be covered by the reissue.
In Handel this was clearly spelled out with the admoni-
tion that the entire disclosure of the original patent should
be considered in determining what the patentee intended to
claim and what invention the patent discloses. T h e court
stated that the entire purpose of the new reissue statute is
41 282 F.2d at 355.
42 230 F.2d 451, 109 U.S.P.Q. 53 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
43 312 F.2d 943, 136 U.S.P.Q. 460 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
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to permit limitations to be added to claims that are too broad
and to be subtracted from claims that are too narrow.
A comparison of In re Wesseler" with the Byers decision
indicates that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is
now taking a view which is diametrically the opposite to the
one taken eleven years ago with reference to the meaning
of the word "error" in the new reissue statute. In this case the
court squarely held that the reissue "error" need not arise
through "inadvertence, accident or mistake."
The Wesseler case was decided by a particularly strong
bench, composed of two former practicing patent lawyers of
renown, an eminent patent trial judge, sitting by assignment,
and two other Court of Customs and Patent Appeals judges
of mature experience.
The record shows that the original patentee presented
claims which were finally rejected as vague and indefinite and
on prior art. The examiner was interviewed, and new claims
containing certain limitations w e r e presented. The older
claims were cancelled with the remark that the amendment
after final rejection was submitted in an effort to expedite
prosecution of the case and to bring it to a close. Applicant
stated that he was attempting to follow completely the proce-
dures and the suggestions presented by the primary examiner
in so far as they were understood.
The reissue claims apparently eliminated one limitation-
to which the Board of Appeals considered that the inven-
tion was confined-and added some new ones. The claims were
not coextensive with those cancelled in the original prosecu-
tion.
44 367 F.2d 838, 151 U.S.P.Q. 339 (C.C.P.A. 1966). In the view
of this writer the Wesseler case is in conflict with cases
such as Lockwood v. Langendorf United Bakeries, Inc.,
324 F.2d 82, 139 U.S.P.Q. 220 (9th Cir. 1963). The confusion
could be eliminated by an authoritative Supreme Court
pronouncement on the subject.
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The state of the prior art at the time was such that the
reissue type claims were not rendered unpatentable by the
prior art.
At this point it is appropriate to suggest that what the
primary examiner should have done was to insist that the
original applicant make clear that the amendment, with
which he obtained allowance of the original, include a state-
ment that its purpose was to cure the rejection of the claims
as vague or indefinite, if that were the fact. If the state of
the record at that time was such that the applicant's attor-
ney did not fully understand the examiner's requirements,
then any misapprehension should have been clarified on the
record. Knowing the well known practice of interviewing
cases after final rejection, those familiar with patent prose-
cution would conclude that, rather than appeal, the patentee
decided to "take what the examiner would allow and run."
The action of the attorney in resting on the claims in
the amendment was deemed erroneous, but the decision is
on the footing that this was a deliberate matter of judg-
ment. The court found that the reissue claims defined pat-
entable subject matter, and were narrower in scope than the
claims cancelled during the original prosecution, but were
broader than the claims of the original patent. The keystone
considerations were that the subject matter of the reissue
claims was disclosed in the original patent, that the objects
of the invention as there stated manifested an intention to
claim it, that the reissue applicant had a right to claim the
invention disclosed in the original, that the original claim-
ed less than he had a right to claim, and that the limitations
which caused this deficiency in claiming w e r e included
"through error."
The court did not agree with the Board that the record
established that the examiner would consider allowance of
the original claims only with the specific limitations involved.
The decision squarely holds that the word "error" as used in
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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the new reissue statute can be the result of a deliberate ac-
tion and need not arise from inadvertence, accident or mistake.
The decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
seems to limit the rule which precludes one who deliberately
adds a limitation to the claims in order to obtain the original
patent from securing a reissue without the limitation to cases
in which the omission of the limitation would render a claim
unpatentable over the prior art, or to cases in which the rec-
ord shows indisputably that t h e applicant expressly dis-
tinguishes the prior art on the basis of that limitation. Here-
tofore it has been generally considered that, when a case is
allowed after final rejection as the result of an interview
and amendment, subject matter without the limitations agreed
upon is abandoned; in other words, that subject matter not
claimed or deliberately jettisoned could not be recouped by
reissue if the failure to claim or the jettisoning were caused
by an error of judgment. However, the Wesseler case may
have the practical impact of permitting any subject matter
disclosed in an original patent, if patentable over the prior
art and not claimed, to be recouped by reissue, subject to the
possible qualification t h at identical subject matter of an
abandoned claim cannot be recouped.
The Wesseler decision opens the gate wide to reissues and
is a radical departure from the Byers decision. Coupled with
the holding in Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v. Big Dutchman,
Inc.,45 which permits a reissue patentee to invoke the attor-
ney-client privilege as to communications between the pat-
entee and its attorneys with respect to the basis of the re-
issue oath, as long as the oath does not refer to such com-
munications, the possibilities of obtaining reissues would seem
to be wide open to those who would expand patent coverage
in the light of knowledge imparted to them by later art.
However, in other recent decisions there are encouraging signs.
Another important c a s e is LaMaur, Inc. v. DeMert &
4r 258 F. Supp. 233, 151 U.S.P.Q. 170 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
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Dougherty, Inc.46 in which the court scrutinized the reissue
patent there involved with the meticulous care with which
reissues should be scrutinized by the Patent Office. The court
accepted many of defendants' proposed findings and conclu-
sions, deleted fifty of them, altered others and initiated some.
The original patent had been involved in an interference
proceeding and during the course of the interference an d
well prior to the termination of prosecution of the original
patent, the patentee learned all of the matters which were
later asserted in the reissue oath. The reissue patent retain-
ed the claims of the original and added two process claims
which involved a method of hair spraying which did not re-
quire a propellant. In the reissue oath the failure to define
the propellant element broadly was the "error". But an addi-
tional affidavit was submitted in support of claims, added
during the reissue prosecution, which omitted the propellant.
These claims were first presented more than two years after
the original patent issued and the accompanying affidavit
presented a new scientific theory. The Court declared the
reissue patent invalid on numerous counts.
First, it was held that since the reissue claims were
predicated upon the new scientific discovery they were not
supported by the original reissue oath, which did not men-
tion this discovery.
Second, since the patentee knew all of the facts alleged
in the reissue oath, well prior to the issuance of the original
patent, there was no inadvertence, accident or mistake. Any
error involved was an error of judgment.
Third, new matter and absence of disclosure in the orig-
inal were cited.
Fourth, the reissue claims were broader than the original
claims and broader than the reissue claims first presented,
46 265 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. ll. 1965).
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and the doubly broadened subject matter was not claimed
until more than two years after the original patent had issued.
In this decision the "ratchet wheel" practice was strongly
discouraged. The ratchet wheel practice consists of first ob-
taining an original patent with knowledge of "defects"; sec-
ond, presenting broadened claims in a reissue patent appli-
cation with a reissue oath, and finally, presenting doubly
broadened claims not supported by the reissue oath. It was
never the intent of the reissue statutes to permit a patentee
with foreknowledge of the "errors" to take out the original
patent and then to have a second wide open opportunity in
the Patent Office to obtain whatever claims he could, without
support from a reissue oath. This writer has been unable to
find any decision which looks into a reissue background with
greater care, perceptiveness and understanding.
A very encouraging indication that the Patent Office is
recognizing that the ruling of In re Wesseler is so liberal as
to call for particularly careful evaluation of the reissue pat-
ent applications now being examined is the case of Ex parte
Do1. 47 In this case the reissue applicant presented, within
the two year period of limitation, broadened claims supported
by a reissue oath. After the expiration of the two years, the
applicant presented certain additional claims which w e r e
"doubly broadened" and not supported by a reissue oath. The
Board of Appeals affirmed the disallowance of the lastmen-
tioned claims and said that:
It appears that the two year period in which
to file for broadened reissue claims is granted
for the purpose of enabling the patentee to
discover particular deficiencies in the breadth
of the claims as originally filed, and not as a
period in which to decide whether or not he
should spread a net to catch any broad sub-
ject matter which he may later decide should
have been captured.
4 155 U.S.P.Q. 477 (Bd. Patent App. 1966).
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The Patent Office referred the fourth paragraph of sec-
tion 251 of title 35 to the time of presentation of the claims
in controversy and not to the time of the filing of the reissue
patent application. However, even in this case the Board al-
lowed reissue claims more limited than those originally pre-
sented in the reissue, considering that the original reissue
oath was adequate for that purpose.
This writer submits that even allowance such as this
should be confined to matters of form an d insubstantial
changes of wording. The mere fact that such claims are more
limited in scope does not per se demonstrate that they are
supported by the reissue oath.
This case, like the LaMaur case, lays down the doctrine
that reissue claims broader than those supported by the re-
issue oath must be filed within two years after the issue of
the original patent.
However, as far as reissue claims supported by the re-
issue oath are concerned, the one year bar arising out of
public sale is referred to the date of filing of the original
patent application.
The new reissue statute contains a provision which says
that the provisions of this title relating to applications for
patent shall be applicable to applications for reissue. This im-
mediately gives rise to the question whether Section 102,
specifying the conditions for patentability in chapter 10, ap-
plies to a reissue.patent or only to the original on which the
reissue is based. The Court of Appeals For the Seventh Cir-
cuit, in Crane Packing Co. v. Spitfire Tool & Machine Co.,48 held
certain claims invalid because the device against which these
claims were asserted was on public sale and in use more than
one year prior to the date of application of the reissue patent.
The court interpreted the above-mentioned portions of the
48 276 F.2d 271, 125 U.S.P.Q. 289 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 820 (1960).
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reissue statute to have reference to the conditions for pat-
entability in chapter 10 of title 35.
Shortly thereafter the same court, sitting en bane, de-
cided Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., v. Paltier Corporation.49
It reversed the previous decision and held that the references
in the reissue statute to "provisions of this title relating to
applications for patent" had reference to chapter 11 rather
than to chapter 10. The apparent error in the earlier decision
rested in the fact that to measure the reissue patent by
prior art as of the date of its filing would cause the original
patent to invalidate any reissue applied for more than one
year thereafter. It had long been the law, prior to the new
reissue statute, that reissue is measured by the prior art con-
ditions existing at the time that the original patent applica-
tion was filed. Nothing in any report of Congress suggested
any intent to change the law in this respect. In the later de-
cision the court points out that a broadened issue may be
applied for within two years of the grant of the original, but
the very wording of the new reissue statute would be in con-
flict with any holding or doctrine to the effect that an appli-
cation for reissue more than one year after publication of the
original patent would be invalid. The later decision points out
that the Patent Office Board of Appeals refused to follow the
former one. One of the concurring opinions approved the re-
49 298 F.2d 48, 132 U.S.P.Q. 219 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 865 (1962). See also Armstrong v. Motorola, Inc., 374
F.2d 764, 152 U.S.P.Q. 535 (7th Cir. 1967).
It is worthy of note that the American Patent Law As-
sociation considered the Spitfire decision (see text accom-
panying note 48 supra) to be without foundation in law
and had obtained leave to file an amicus curiae brief in
support for the petition for a writ of certiorari.
In Hartzell Indus., Inc. v. McCauley Indus. Corp., 304
F.2d 481, 134 U.S.P.Q. 275 (6th Cir. 1962), the Court of Ap-
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issue but not the holding on the ground that in the Union
Asbestos case the claims in controversy were not broadened.
In a brief prepared by the late Floyd H. Crews, a dis-
tinguished New York patent attorney, it is related that in
1880 the ratio of reissues to original patents was 3.9 percent
As a result of Supreme Court decisions adverse to reissue, the
ratio dropped to 0.33 percent in 1890 and then ascended to
0.9 percent by 1940. The Supreme Court reviewed reissue pat-
ent cases in 1940, 1942, and 1945, and by 1950 the ratio had
again descended to 0.3 percent. These figures prompt inquiry
as to whether the number of reissues is dependent on the
judicial climate or on the number of "errors without deceptive
intention" bona fide made by applicants. Between 1895 and
1945 the Supreme Court occasionally accepted reissue patent
cases for review. If reissues were such a matter of profound
public interest from 1880 to 1945 there is reason to urge that
they are of even greater public interest in this day of rapid
technological development.
In conclusion, speculation is invited as to whether a body
of decisional law dealing with the question whether "errors"
made in original patents constitute malpractice might have
any restraining influence on the filing of resissue applica-
tions. It is probable that, almost universally, reissue-type er-
rors occur in spite of the exercise of the very best care usually
applied to their cases by patent lawyers in the community.
Nonetheless, this so often overlooked possibility is worthy of
consideration.
It is indeed time to look at reissues again.
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